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Katz: From Bush v. Gore to Namudno: A Response to Professor Amar

FROM BUSH V. GORE TO NAMUDNO: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR AMAR
Ellen D. Katz*
INTRODUCTION
In his Dunwody Lecture, Professor Akhil Amar invites us to revisit
the Bush v. Gore controversy and consider what went wrong.1 This
short essay responds to Professor Amar by taking up his invitation and
looking at the decision through a seemingly improbable lens, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision last June in Northwest Austin Municipal
Utility District No. One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder.2 Among its many
surprises, NAMUDNO helps illuminate the Court’s fundamental error
nine years ago.
Professor Amar forcefully argues that the mistrust with which the
Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority viewed the Florida Supreme Court
was both unjustified and disastrously consequential.3 What NAMUDNO
helps us see is that such mistrust, be it mistaken or warranted, is not
necessarily incompatible with a sound judicial response. NAMUDNO
shows that the Court’s most profound error in Bush v. Gore was not the
premise from which the Justices began, though flawed it may have
been, but rather where they went from there.4
CONNECTING BUSH V. GORE TO NAMUDNO
Facially, Bush v. Gore and NAMUDNO appear unrelated. Bush v.
Gore famously closed down a court-ordered statewide recount in
Florida and effectively ended the 2000 presidential election dispute.5
NAMUDNO sidestepped the question of congressional power to
reauthorize § 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)—a provision requiring
jurisdictions with a history of discrimination in voting to obtain federal
approval prior to changing any aspect of their voting law.6
The decisions involved distinct legal questions and institutional
actors, and differences between the cases abound. Bush v. Gore and
NAMUDNO are nevertheless linked in two important ways.

*
1.
(2009).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945
129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
Amar, supra note 1, at 950–51, 961.
See infra notes 28–49 and accompanying text.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105–06 (2000) (per curiam).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
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Fabricated Intent
In both Bush v. Gore and NAMUDNO, the Court said something that
was patently false. The Bush v. Gore majority attributed to the Florida
Supreme Court a statement the state court never made. NAMUDNO, for
its part, said Congress meant to allow something it never intended to
allow.
In Bush v. Gore, the false statement was the Court’s assertion that
“the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature
intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5 [.]”7 The
Bush v. Gore majority offered this statement as explanation for its
refusal to let the state court craft a remedy for the constitutional defect it
identified in the Florida recount process.8 Remanding for remedial
action was not possible, said the Court, because the Florida Supreme
Court had already said that state law did not allow for such a remedy.9
The problem was that the Florida Supreme Court never made this
statement. In fact, the Florida court had no occasion whatsoever to
address whether the state’s interest in participating voluntarily in one
aspect of the federal system (i.e., the so-called “safe harbor”)
outweighed the competing interests underlying the recount. The Florida
court had made a tangential reference to the federal system in an earlier
opinion addressing a distinct point,10 but that reference hardly
constituted an unequivocal statement of state law on point. The Bush v.
Gore majority nevertheless said that it was an unequivocal statement, an
assertion Larry Kramer vividly labeled “nothing less than a deliberate,
bold-faced lie.”11
A similar charge might be lodged against the Court’s holding in
NAMUDNO. There, all nine Justices agreed that the VRA allowed the
plaintiff to apply for a statutory exemption that Congress never
authorized and never intended to allow.
The VRA allows a “political subdivision” to seek this exemption,
known as bailout, but defines a “political subdivision” in terms that
facially exclude the plaintiff in NAMUDNO. The Austin Water District
was neither a county nor a state subdivision “which conducts
7. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla. 2000)
(citing 3 U.S.C. §§ 1–10 (2006), which govern the federal electoral process).
11. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court in Politics, in THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF
2000 105, 149 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Basic Books 2001); see also David A. Strauss, Bush v
Gore: What Were They Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 184,
204 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., University of Chicago Press 2001)
[hereinafter THE VOTE] (concluding “that the [U.S. Supreme] Court ‘trumped’ the ‘supposed
lawlessness’ of the Florida Supreme Court with [its own] lawlessness”) (internal quotation
marks added).
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registration for voting” when the county does not.12 The Court
nevertheless concluded that the plaintiff was eligible for the exemption
based on a contrived statutory construction that, as Rick Hasen pointed
out, “virtually no lawyer thought was plausible.”13
Chief Justice Roberts seemed well aware of this. He acknowledged
that the holding required the Court to take an “unusual” step and ignore
an explicit statutory definition, and that circumstances existed in which
the district court’s contrary holding of ineligibility “might well be
correct.”14 The Chief Justice did not bother to address either the
legislative history or a Justice Department regulation that directly
contradicted what the Court read the 1982 VRA amendments to have
accomplished.15 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts anemically posited that
“[i]t is unlikely” Congress intended for the bailout provision to have an
effect that was, in fact, well-documented and universally understood
when Congress reauthorized the statute in 2006.16
The Court’s improbable ruling in NAMUDNO, much like its false
statement in Bush v. Gore, invites speculation. Did Chief Justice
Roberts “blink,” and shy away from striking down a resonant statute he
believed to be unconstitutional?17 Or did he simply lack the votes to
strike down a regime he wanted to invalidate?18 Did the so-called liberal
Justices strategically sign on without comment to block invalidation of
the VRA, or did they too harbor serious qualms about the statute’s
validity?19
Needless to say, looking beyond the text of an opinion to decode
hidden intent is a fraught enterprise. Recognizing that speculation is the
best we can do, the next section suggests that the false statements in
Bush v. Gore and NAMUDNO have a common source.

12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (2006).
13. See Initial Thoughts on NAMUDNO: Chief Justice Roberts Blinked,
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013903.html (June 22, 2009, 08:00 EST) [hereinafter Initial
Thoughts].
14. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2514 (2009).
15. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 2 (1981) (“The standard for bail-out is broadened
to permit political subdivisions, as defined in Section 14(c)(2), in covered states to seek to bail
out although the state itself may remain covered.”); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 57 n.192 (1982)
(“Towns and cities within counties may not bailout separately.”); Judicial Administration, 28
C.F.R. §§ 51.2, 51.5 (2008); Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486 (Jan. 6, 1987).
16. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2516.
17. Initial Thoughts, supra note 13.
18. David G. Savage, A Rare Week of Harmony on High Court, L.A. TIMES, June 29,
2009, at A10, available at 2009 WLNR 12385782 (discussing this point).
19. Id.
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Failed Deliberation
Animating the Court in both Bush v. Gore and NAMUDNO was the
belief that the measures under challenge in both cases were the product
of failed deliberation. This belief posits that the Florida Supreme Court
ordered a recount and that Congress renewed the Voting Rights Act not
as considered judgments but instead as unreflective means to advance
raw political preferences. Both institutions were seen to have abandoned
their obligation to deliberate prior to ordering the contested measures.
In Bush v. Gore, this belief originated in a series of strained statutory
rulings issued by the Florida Supreme Court in the early weeks of the
2000 presidential election dispute.20 These rulings gave rise to the belief
that the state court was neither interested in nor engaged in the act of
judging at all. To the Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority (and to other
observers),21 the state court appeared to be fixated on handing the
election to Vice President Gore.22 A given ruling might find legal
support but that fact was beside the point. Intent mattered, and the
Florida court—at least in the eyes of the Bush v. Gore majority—had
the wrong intent.
Intent appears to have mattered in NAMUDNO as well. Here the
Justices thought Congress had the wrong intent when it voted in 2006 to
renew the VRA. This view posits that Congress saw the VRA as too
sacrosanct to let lapse, and would have reauthorized the statute
regardless of whether contemporary conditions justified it.23 Congress,
to be sure, amassed a detailed evidentiary record, but, the argument
goes, that it did so not to guide its decision-making, but rather to justify
a decision it had already made.
This view is a plausible one. The VRA has tremendous symbolic
resonance, even while its specific terms remain largely obscure. With
few exceptions,24 members of Congress had little desire to seek reelection as someone who had voted against the VRA.25 As Justice
Scalia pointedly asked at oral argument, “[D]o you ever seriously
20. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1239–40 (Fla.
2000).
21. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Two–and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v Gore, in THE
VOTE, supra note 11, at 98, 101 (noting with disapproval that the Florida Supreme Court ruled
for Gore each time).
22. See Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its
Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 194 & nn.64, 66 (2001).
23. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act and
Noisy Statutory Interpretation (draft).
24. See Carl Hulse, Rebellion Stalls Extension of Voting Act, N.Y.TIMES, June 22, 2006, at
A23, available at 2006 WLNR 10749989 (noting that only a few House members did not
support the bill).
25. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, By a Vote of 98-0, Senate Approves 25-Year Extension of Voting
Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2006, at A16, available at 2006 WLNR 12545848.
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expect Congress to vote against a re-extension of the Voting Rights
Act?”26
That reauthorization appeared fated, however, does not mean it was
unwarranted. The sizeable record Congress amassed to support
reauthorization contained considerable, albeit not unequivocal, evidence
supporting the claim that § 5 of the VRA was still needed.27 In other
words, reauthorization might have been both warranted and
preordained, just as the rulings issued by the Florida Supreme Court
might have comported both with the law and a predisposition for a Gore
victory. In both cases, a truly deliberative process might have yielded
the very measures the decisionmakers selected. But, in the eyes of the
Court, neither of the challenged measures had in fact emerged from
such a process. Deliberation had failed and that failure required a
judicial response.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FAILED DELIBERATION
Professor Amar’s remarks model one way a reviewing court might
respond to failed deliberation. Specifically, a court might provide an
insufficiently deliberative decision with its missing rationale. Professor
Amar does this when he drafts the opinion he thinks the Florida
Supreme Court should have issued.28 Professor Amar posits that the
Florida court’s rulings were legitimate because his draft opinion shows
them to be “legally defensible.”29
This approach bears a rough resemblance to what Justice Brennan
did elsewhere in saying “[i]t is enough that we be able to perceive a
basis upon which” the challenged decision might have been reached.30
Writing for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, Justice Brennan upheld
congressional power to enact § 4(e) of the VRA of 1965.31 His opinion
never accused Congress of failing to deliberate over the measure, and
indeed seemed skeptical of Justice Harlan’s dissenting allusion to a
failure of this sort.32 Regardless, Justice Brennan’s analysis made clear
that failed deliberation would be of no consequence. So long as the
26. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08-322).
27. See, e.g., NAMUDNO v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 247–66 (D.D.C. 2008)
(discussing this evidence).
28. Amar, supra note 1, at 953–56.
29. Amar, supra note 1, at 955–56 (stating that the Florida Supreme Court “did the right
legal things and for the right legal reasons”).
30. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966).
31. Id. at 646–47.
32. Compare id. at 669 & n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]here is simply no
legislative record supporting such hypothesized discrimination of the sort we have hitherto
insisted upon” and that there “were no committee hearings or reports referring to this section,
which was introduced from the floor.”), with id. at 645 n.3 (majority opinion) (discussing
legislative history to § 4(e)).
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Justices could “perceive” a basis on which 4(e) might be needed, and
craft their own argument, the statute was valid.33
Much like Justice Brennan in Morgan, Professor Amar equates his
ability to “perceive” a basis for the Florida court’s rulings with their
legitimacy. He disputes the notion that the Florida court failed to
deliberate precisely because the opinion he has drafted employs sound
interpretive methods to reach the same results.34 Professor Amar
laments the fact that “[t]he Florida Justices never offered up such a crisp
and cogent Article II explanation of their conduct in the 2000
election.”35 Had they done so, Amar suggests, the legitimacy of the
court’s conduct—and “the basic error” in claims to the contrary—
“would have been clear for all to see.”36
Perhaps the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court would not have
harbored the suspicions they held had the Florida Supreme Court issued
the exemplary Amar opinion in the first instance. But to do so, the state
court would have needed to anticipate federal issues that were obscure
prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s first per curiam opinion in the
dispute. By the time the Florida court had the opportunity to address
these issues on remand, the damage had been done. The Bush v. Gore
majority no longer trusted the state court and, I suspect, nothing the
Florida court could have said—including what Professor Amar says in
his opinion—would have changed that.
In fact, the Bush v. Gore majority confronted versions of the
explanation the Amar opinion offers—less crisp, less cogent perhaps,
but comprehensible versions nevertheless. These Justices understood
well that sound interpretative methods could have produced the very
results reached by the Florida court. They, however, also believed that
such methods had not in fact served as the state court’s guide.37
To the majority in Bush v. Gore, actual intent mattered. Partisan bias
for a preordained result was not judicial craft—and could not become
craft simply by tacking on (even good) legal argument. The Bush v.
Gore majority consequently had no interest in judicial review of the sort
Professor Amar models, or even the more rigorous, “show your work”
approach the Rehnquist Court had developed in Morgan’s stead.38
What the Court did instead was to eliminate review entirely. The
Bush v. Gore majority equated a failure of deliberation with an
abdication of responsibility, and viewed it as cause to step into the shoes
33. Id. at 653.
34. Amar, supra note 1, at 954.
35. Amar, supra note 1, at 955.
36. Amar, supra note 1, at 953–54.
37. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 11, at 204 (questioning whether the Supreme Court
Justices’ view of the Florida Supreme Court was correct).
38. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
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of the Florida Supreme Court. These Justices decided the case as if they
themselves were members of the state court, and decreed (albeit through
false attribution) that Florida law allowed no remedy for the
constitutionally defective recount.39 In so doing, they wholly eliminated
the state court’s decision-making power.
Scores of commentators have explained why this was a very bad
idea.40 The Court in NAMUDNO nevertheless seemed poised to follow
this approach with regard to Congress. The district court in NAMUDNO
had already issued an opinion much like Professor Amar’s in that it
labored to provide the strongest possible defense for the decision under
review. Judge Tatel’s lengthy opinion for the unanimous panel carefully
parsed the congressional record for every shred of supporting evidence
and developed a legal argument to justify the 2006 reauthorization.41
The Justices in NAMUDNO, however, were not interested in this
approach. At oral argument, many of the Justices seemed indifferent to
Congress’s judgment that the VRA remained necessary. Question after
question asked not whether Congress had the power to make the
judgment it did, but rather whether reauthorization itself was a good
idea. Justice Scalia pointedly revealed this stance when he scoffed at the
notion that Congress had considered the claim that bailout was
ineffective. “The question,” he said, “is whether [the claim is] right, not
whether Congress rejected it.”42
Ultimately, the Court voted to supplant Congress’s judgment, but not
in the manner many expected. Rather than throw out the statute, the
Justices simply rewrote it. The revision, which may prove to be a good
one,43 was propelled by the belief that someone had to do something.
Congress had been unwilling to engage in the necessary deliberation
over the statute’s reach. The Justices accordingly believed they needed
to step up and step into Congress’s shoes and act in its stead.44
39. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110–11 (2000); supra notes 7–9 and accompanying
text.
40. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 11, at 148–49; Strauss, supra note 11, at 185–86; Ward
Farnsworth, “To Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong”: A User’s Guide to Judicial
Lawlessness, 86 MINN. L. REV. 227, 252 (2001) (“A preemptive strike against possible further
transgressions by the state court . . . is an extraordinary measure. . . . The Supreme Court would
have done better to act as the referee of referees.”).
41. See generally Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2008).
42. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 37.
43. If they apply, small jurisdictions like the NAMUDNO plaintiff should be able to obtain
the exemption more readily than larger units like counties and states, which must show not only
their compliance with the bailout criteria, but the compliance of all their jurisdictional subunits.
See, e.g., Posting of J. Gerald Hebert to Campaign Legal Center Blog,
http://www.clcblog.org/blog_item-76.html (Oct. 5, 2006). Enabling eligible jurisdictions to
bailout would calibrate the statute’s regulatory reach, channel resources to those places that
most need them, and thereby make the regime less vulnerable in a future legal challenge.
44. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
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NAMUDNO resembles the Bush v. Gore majority’s response to
failed deliberation except for one crucial fact. The NAMUDNO Court
carefully preserved a realm for congressional action. The Court
assumed a legislative role, but occupied it only briefly, coupling its
statutory revision with language meant to prod Congress to act more
deliberatively in the future.
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion manages to avoid striking down the
statute while nevertheless displacing the district court’s broad opinion
and, along the way, making clear how he (and I believe, a solid
majority45 of the Court) would resolve the constitutional question.
Before invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Chief
Justice relentlessly piles up reason after reason why the 2006
reauthorization is constitutionally infirm.46 The opinion notably
mentions no serious counterarguments, citing instead only to boilerplate
language that Congress is a coequal branch and to the fact the district
court thought the statute was just fine.47
All this language is technically dicta, but it might be better
understood as the operative holding—one that strikes down the statute
but stays the order until the next case in which the question is presented.
In other words, NAMUDNO remands the VRA to Congress with a time
limit and a warning. It puts Congress on notice that the Court will scrap
the statute in the next case, unless something significant about the
statutory regime will have changed by then.
Some change may emerge from NAMUDNO’s statutory
amendment,48 but that change is unlikely to be enough to satisfy the
Court. And it remains to be seen whether Congress will engage in the
45. At argument, Justice Kennedy voiced considerable skepticism about the VRA’s
regional burdens, and has previously questioned both the VRA’s reliance on race-based
measures and the scope of congressional power to enforce civil rights generally. See Transcript
of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 22; see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244–45
(2009); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 744–59 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). For their part, the so-called liberal Justices, offered no sustained defense of the
statute during argument, and have previously questioned its continued importance. See, e.g.,
Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 1987 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2511–12 (citations omitted) (noting the “substantial
‘federalism costs’” § 5 exacts, its broad application to all electoral changes “however
innocuous,” the fact that “[t]hings have changed in the South,” that the racial gap in voter
registration and turnout rates is diminished and in places nonexistent, that minority candidates
hold elected office “at unprecedented levels,” that “[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of federal
decrees are rare,” the dated character of the coverage formula, its weak relation to current
conditions, and the fact that the distinct burdens imposed on covered jurisdictions “may no
longer” be warranted).
47. Id. at 2513 (citations omitted).
48. See First Local Government Seeks Voting Rights Bailout Post Supreme Court Ruling,
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/08/first-local-government-seeks-voting-rights-bailoutpost-supreme-court-ruling.html (Aug. 4, 2009).
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deliberation NAMUDNO effectively mandates.49 What is clear is that
the Court did not follow Bush v. Gore all the way. After stepping in, the
Court stepped back again. It gave Congress the opportunity to act in
response to what NAMUDNO says.
The decision accordingly accomplished what I had hoped it would:
namely, the Court found a way to send the statute back to Congress for
deliberation.50 The mechanism for accomplishing this is unexpected, to
be sure. NAMUDNO’s stern warning promises invalidation but buys
time with a statutory revision that looks ominously like what the Court
did in Bush v. Gore. The Court nevertheless recognized that revision or
retention of a statute like the VRA is a job best left to Congress.
NAMUDNO wisely focused on getting Congress to do its job, rather
than doing that job itself.
CONCLUSION
NAMUDNO’s unexpected holding was greeted with considerable
praise.51 Bush v. Gore’s was not. This difference in reception helps
crystallize what went wrong in Bush v. Gore. Both decisions identified a
failure of deliberation and both saw that failure as reason to assume the
role of the institution under review. But while the Bush v. Gore majority
assumed that role in its entirety, the NAMUDNO Court was careful to
preserve a space for a congressional response. The Court structured its
opinion to encourage, to prod, and—almost certainly—to require
Congress to act.
Failed deliberation, to be sure, is not easily diagnosed, and the
prospect of a false positive might itself be sufficient reason to avoid the
inquiry entirely. Professor Amar’s remarks lend support for this view
and indeed model what may well be a preferable form of review.
49. Insofar as Congress wants the § 5 regime to continue in roughly its current state, it
should do (at least) two things. First, it should instruct the Department of Justice to identify
jurisdictions eligible for bailout, actively encourage them to apply, and support such
applications once filed. Second, Congress should bolster the comparative case the Court has
now made clear is needed for § 5 to survive scrutiny. While the existing congressional record
contains comparative evidence, see Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and
Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT
REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER, (A.
Henderson, ed., 2007), Congress should collect additional, more localized evidence addressing
the extent to which the obstacles minority voters confront in covered jurisdictions are distinct
from the ones they face elsewhere. NAMUDNO strongly suggests that § 5’s validity rests on
evidence of this sort, and that the statute’s prophylactic effect is not sufficient to prove the point.
See NAMUDNO, at 2512; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 22, 28, 30, 31, 34–36,
48–49.
50. Ellen D. Katz, Opinion, Voting Rights Act § 5: Leave It Up to Congress, 31 NAT’L L.
J. Apr. 13, 2009.
51. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Judicial Statesmanship on Voting Rights, http://www.national
journal.com/njmagazine/print_friendly.php?ID=or_20090624_4339 (June 27, 2009).
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NAMUDNO, however, makes clear that failed deliberation may be
diagnosed without necessary ill effect and potentially to productive end.
Congress may ultimately squander the opportunity NAMUDNO
provides. The Court was nevertheless wise to have provided it.
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